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Optimal Policies with Strategic Distortions 
ABSTRACT 
Recent work in optimal trade policy  for imperfectly competitive markets 
usually identifies the optimal level of an instrument, and when more 
instruments are allowed, general interpretations have been unavailable,  This 
paper analyzes the jointly optimal levels of a Variety of instruments with 
oligopolistic competition.  A targeting principle for identifying optimal 
policies is derived using the concept of a "strategic distortion."  It is 
shown how optimal policies vary  with the distortions present and the number of 
firms, as  well as  assumptions about market segmentation and regulation.  The 
principles of targeting are illustrated using agricultural marketing boards. 
Kala Krishna  Marie C. Thursby 
Department of Economics  Department of  Economics 
Harvard University  Lorch Hall 
Litteuer 215  University of  Michigan 
Cambridge, MA 02138  Ann Arbor, MI 48109 1.  Introduction 
Our understanding  of the way in which perfectly competitive markets 
function, and of optimal policy for such markets when various distortions 
exist is quite good.  Optimal policies are often explained by using the 
general principle of targeting developed by Bhagwati, Ramaswami  and 
Srinivasan,1  among others, and their non-uniqueness is explained by the Lerner 
symmetry theorem, Lerner (1936),  In contrast to this,  our understanding of 
optimal policy in oligopolistic markets is more  limited, 
In part, this is because there are so many possible models of 
oligopolistic behavior, both static and dynamic, that general results are hard 
to come by.  Even limiting ourselves to static models, policies which 
"directly" restrict trade,  such  as  quotas  or  content  protection,  have very 
dif#erent  effects from those which do so  indirectly" via taxes and subsidies. 
The former have effects like those of a regime change while the latter  do 
not.2  Even the literature on indirect policies makes different assumptions 
about factors which affect the results.  Assumptions about the strategic 
variables used, the number of firms, possible distortions, and the instruments 
considered vary among papers.  Assumptions about market segmentation, or the 
lack of it,  and regulations on firm behavior are also crucial and have not 
been systematically analyzed. 
- 
In  this paper we develop a targeting approach which helps explain the 
nature of optimal policies and how they vary with differences in the above 
assumptions.  Since the literature has focused on the first set of assumptions 
given above, there is some understanding of how optimal policies vary with these assumptions.  Our contribution here is to identify overall optimal 
policies and show that they can be interpreted in a targeting framework.  This 
provides a unified way of looking at much of the literature and shows how 
confining attention to one policy, as is often done, can result in the 
identification of overall suboptimal policies.  In addition, we use this 
framework to analyze how regulations influence  optimal policies by linking 
distortions and creating new ones, both of which affect the targeting of 
policies.  We consider  regulations which limit domestic monopoly power, as 
well as arbitrage, which we show should be thought of as a form of regulation. 
We analyze optimal policies  for marketing boards since these provide a rich 
variety of types of distortions and regulations.  Next, we briefly survey how 
our work relates to other work  in strategic trade policy. 
Earlier work, such as that of Auquier and Caves (1979), deals with trade 
policies when there is monopoly.  Work on oligopoly began with that of Spence 
and Brander (1983), who analyze a Cournot duopoly with one home and one 
foreign firm and show that an export subsidy can improve welfare.3 Eaton and 
Grossman  (1986) show that the strategic variable used is critical.  They 
identify a strategic distortion using a conjectural variations model, and the 
show that this distortion may require a tax on exports with Bertrand 
competition.  This strategic distortion differs from the usual terms of trade 
distortion.4  Dixt (1984) and Eaton and Grossman analyze policy when there 
are more firms and domestic consumption. 
Only a few papers  in this  area consider more than one policy instrument. 
Eaton and Grossman consider the direction of production and trade taxes 
separately, but they do not analyze jointly optimal policies or develop a —3— 
targeting approach.  For the Cournot case, Spencer and Brander  (1983)  consider 
jointly optimal R&O and export policies.  Dixit (1984)  examines optimal 
production and trade tax/subsidies in the Cournot case, and Dixit (1986) 
studies how optimal trade and production taxes are affected by changes in 
parameters using a conjectural variations model and a linear example.  Dixit 
(1988) calculates the optimal levels of these instruments for a simulation 
model of the U.S. automobile industry.  Cheng (1986) analyzes optimal tariffs 
and production subsidies for a linear  example.  A targeting approach is not 
the focus of any of this work, and most of it deals with segmented markets,5 
Our work is also related to the literature  on agricultural marketing 
boards.  The work most closely related to ours is that of Just et al.  (1979), 
Markusen (1984). and Thursby (l987).6  While they consider some of the types 
of marketing boards we do, neither Just et al,  (1979)  nor Markusen (1984) 
focus on strategic interactions between boards.  Thursby  (1987)  does consider 
strategic interactions between boards but confines her analysis to a linear 
Cournot example when markets are segmented. 
The next section sets up the oroblem and discusses the institutional 
variations we consider.  Sections 3 and 4 contain the analysis of duopoly with 
market segmentation.  in these sections each board is the sole supplier to 
consumers in its home market and competes with a foreign board in a third 
market.  Thus boards have monopoly power over domestic consumers.  They may or 
may not exercise monopsony power over competitive suppliers depending on 
whether the boards are producer cartels or monopsonists.  Thus, there are 
three distortions possible.  First, there is monopsony power which causes a 
board to purchase too little from competitive suppliers.  Next,  there is -.4-. 
monopoly power which causes it to sell too little at home.  These production 
and consumption distortions are shown to be optimally targeted by production 
and consumption subsidies.  In addition, there is a strategic distortion along 
the lines of Eaton and Grossman (1986).  This arises due to the boards 
inability to precommit to output levels.  The government's ability to 
precommit to taxes and subsidies allows it to correct this distortion.  Trade 
poicy optimally targets this distortion and may require a tax or subsidy on 
exports depending on the strategic variable, as shown in Section 3. 
Section 4 considers  the effect of a regulation which limits domestic 
monopoly power by enforcing marginal cost pricing at home.  This regulation 
links  distortions by linking domestic and export sales, and this is reflected 
in the optimal targeting rule.  While the regulation removes the consumption 
distortion, it creates another distortion since it encourages boards to raise 
exports  in order to raise marginal cost and domestic price.  Optimal policy 
can be implemented by a single instrument,  the trade tax/subsidy, and its 
level  is determined by both the linkage of distortions and the strategic 
distortion. 
The following section extends the analysis to many boards at home and 
abroad,  As expected, having more domestic boards reduces market power in the 
domestic market which reduces both consumption and production distortions.  It 
also creates a terms of trade distortion because the existence of many home 
boards removes the ability of a board to fully internalize the effects of its 
actions on the terms of trade.  The strategic distortion remains but depends 
on the number of firms.  In this case the targeting principle suggests that 
trade tax/subsidies be directed towards the terms of trade distortion as well 
as the strategic distortion. -5-. 
In Section 6, we consider  the effects of arbitrage on targeting.  With 
arbitrage a board cannot determine the amount of home and foreign sales 
independently.  In this case, a board which is regulated in its domestic 
pricing will be forced to act much like a competitive board.  we show that the 
optimal policy in such a case is a trade policy targeted towards the terms of 
trade distortion, as this is the only distortion present.  Without price 
regulation, there is room for strategic behavior on the part of the board.  As 
was the case with market segmentation, the board's inability to precommit 
creates a strategic distortion which the government can offset because of its 
ability to precommit to tax/subsidy policies.  With arbitrage, however, the 
inability of the board to determine home and foreign sales independently links 
distortions, and this affects the targeting of policy.  In particular, our 
results suggest targeting a consumption subsidy to offset any consumption 
distortion, and targeting a production subsidy toward the remaining 
distortions including the strategic distortion.  In addition, we show that the 
consumption distortion is linked through arbitrage to the price abroad and the 
strategic  distortion includes a linkage effect as well.  Recall that linkage 
effects are not present and do not affect policy with market segmentation 
unless domestic price is regulated. 
These results suggest that a useful way to think of policy comparisons in 
situations with and without arbitrage is in terms of a change in regime.  That 
is, arbitrage fundamentally changes the way the board is able to operate, and 
arbitrage, like a regulation, constrains the profit maximization opportunities 
open to the board.  This in turn affects optimal policy. 2.  The Problem 
Agricultural trade  is often conducted through marketing boards for the 
product in question.  Marketing boards exist for a number of commodities, 
including wheat, rice, jute, cocoa and coffee and are used by a number  of 
countries  including  Australia  and  Canada.7  These  boards  vary  greatly  across 
countries,  in  some  instances  they  are  producer  cartels  who  maximize  profits  of 
competitive  producers,  while  in  other  cases,  they  are  monopsonists  who  buy 
from  competitive  producers.  In  many  cases,  boards  are  regulated  so  that  they 
can  exercise  market  power  in  the  foreign  market,  but  not  in  the  domestic 
market, 
Initially  we consider a duopoly situation with market segmentation. 
There is a marketing board in each country.  Each board purchases a 
homogeneous commodity from competitive producers in its own country and 
supplies its own domestic demand.  However, each competes in a third market 
with the other marketing board.  d(y) is the domestic  inverse demand function, 
while d*(y*)  is the foreign countrys domestic inverse demand.  y and y  are 
own country  sales of each board.  The inverse demand in the third country is 
given by  D(x, x*), where x and x' are sales of each board to the  third 
country.  Notice that while a homogeneous good is provided by all  domestic 
suppliers, domestic production may be imperfectly substitutable with foreign 
production.8  With market segmentation, each board can price discriminate 
between its domestic market and the third market.  The inverse supply function 
from competitive producers is given by c(x + y)  at home and c(x' ÷ y*) 
abroad, where c and c* are marginal cost functions. 
Four institutional variations are considered with market segmentation. 
The board maximizes either profits or producer surplus.  The profit maximizing —7— 
board is called a 'P' board while the surplus maximizing one  is a  '5' board. 
In addition, the board may be regulated to supply domestic demand at its 
marginal cost.  This  is equivalent to forcing competitive supply in the home 
market, with the board as the sole marketing agent in international 
transactions.  The absence of regulation is denoted by  'N' whi1e its presence 
is denoted by  'R'.  Thus four combinations are possible, and four kinds of 
marketing boards, denoted by PN,  PR,  SN, and SR.  are analyzed. 
We assume that the government has the ability to tax or subsidize 
exports, domestic production and consumption.  s, v and r de'ote the level  of 
the export subsidy, production subsidy, and co'sumption subsidy if they are 
positive and denote taxes, in the event they are negative. 
The timing of moves is crucial.  The government moves first and sets 
taxes/subsidies.  Boards take these as given in making their decisions,  We 
assume that the government sets these instruments to maximize social welfare, 
Social welfare is derived, as usue.  the basis of having a numeraire good 
which is competitively supplied and an aggregate consuner who gets all profits 
and government revenues.  Each marketing board chooses its domestic and 
foreign sales to maximize  its objective function, subject to any constrants 
imposed by regulation. 
Before we begin the analysis, we would like to stress that we use a model 
of conjectural variations only to parameterize the nature of competition.  As 
is well known, the appropriate choice of conjectural variations gives the 
special cases of Cournot and Bertrand competition.9  Also we are considering 
optimal policies of the government without retaliation.  That is, although the 
foreign government can also set tax/subsidy policies, we do not look for  an —B-. 
equilibrium in that game. 
3.  Market Sementati  on:  .Unreul  ated Duo ml 
We will first consider the board's problem, and then analyze the optimal 
government policy.  We will consider the behavior of a domestic board of any 
type, and we will assume that the foreign board is similar to the domestic 
one.1°  Throughout, r will denote the objective function of the domestic board. 
Table  I  gives profits of the PN and SN boards.  These are the sum of revenues 
from sales at home and abroad and net subsidies from the government, less 
costs to the board.  Notice the costs of the RN and SN boards differ.  This is 
because the per unit cost to the RN board is the competitive supply price 
which rises as the amount purchased increases. Its  total cost is this supply 
price multiplied by its purchases.  However total  cost to the SN board, 
C(x÷y), is just the area under the competitive supply curve. 
As usual, each kind of board chooses its home and foreign sales, y and x, 
to maximize  its objective function, given government policies and its 
conjectural variation parameter which is denoted by y for the home board and 
y* for the foreign board.  Both x and y are chosen according to the  first 
order conditions for profit maximization given in Table 1. 
The optimal choice of y is given by the second first order condition for 
profit maximization and is independent of x*.  This equation defines y for 
every x and (r÷v), denoted by y(x, rev).  Substituting for y)  in the other 
first order condition defines the optimal  level  of x for every value of 
(r+v), (sev), x* and y,  An analogous procedure defines x* for every value of 
(r*+v*), (s*+v*), x, and 7*.  These two equations in x and x  thus implicitly —9— 
define the analogues of the familiar best response functions for the home and 
foreign boards.  We assume second order conditions and the usual stability 
conditions hold in our model, so that their intersection gives the equilibrium 
x and x* for given tax policies of the governments.  The usual comparative 
statics exercises can also be performed by linearizing these two best response 
functions.  Notice that cnanges in  (r+v)  or  (s+v)  shift the home best response 
function,.  and this traces out the foreign best response function.  Therefore, 
dx*  Ida 
the ratio of the comparative statics terms,  for a = (r+v)  or  (s+v), 
gives the slope of the foreign boards best response function, g.  We assume 
the own effects dominate cross effects so that the relative slopes of the best 
response functions insure stability. 
Now consider the choice of r, s, and v by the government in the PN case. 
The government wishes to set its  instruments so as to maximize social welfare. 
As usual, domestic demand arises from maximization of IJ(y)  + n where n is the 
amount of the numeraire good.  The consumer gets all profits and government 
revenues so that the budget constraint is given by 
+  n = yr  + T +  C 
where T is government tax revenue whicfl equals -[(r÷v)y + (s+v)x],  and  is 
the price consumers pay.  P  is taken as given by the consumer.  In addition, 
= c(x÷y)(x+y)  -  JX+YC(q)dq  the profits of competitive producers.  All 
prof  its  and government revenues are returned in a lump sum manner to the 
consumer, so that it,  n  and I are also taken as given constants  in the utility 
maximization problem.  Substituting for n from the budget constraint has the 
consumer choosing y to maximize U(y) — 
P0y 
+ It  +  + I.  Thus 
U'(y)  d(y) = 
P0 due to utility maximization. This gives social welfare as given in Table 1.  Since x  and y depend on 
only (r+v) and  (s+v),  so does welfarei1  Also, as U(y)  Py 
= $(y)  is 
consumer surplus and it +  T  = ft  is net profits of the board, welfare  is just 
the sum of the board's net profits, consumer surplus, and the surplus of 
competitive producers. 
Now we can turn to the optimal levels of  (r+v)  and  (s+v).  The government 
chooses  (r+v)  and (s+v)  to maximize welfare.  The first order conditions for 
this problem, after substituting in the board's first order conditions, are 
given in Table 1.  We assume that the second order conditions hold, so that 
these first order conditions in turn yield the optimal policies also given in 
Table 1.  Notice that only (r+v)  and (sty)  can be defined.  This arises from 
the observation that an export subsidy at any rate has the same effect as a 
consumption tax and production subsidy at the same rate.  Hence there is one 
degree of freedom in choosing r, s, and v.  Also notice that as x and y  depend 
on  (r+v)  and  (s+v),  the solutions for these values are implicit, not expiicit 
The first term in the optimal  level  of (s+v), ft*(gy). is the strategic 
distortion previously mentioned.  For example, with downward sloping best 
responses and Cournot competition, this calls for a subsidy on exports as 
< C when the domestic and foreign goods are substitutes and g < y.  This 
is because the domestic marketing board takes x* as given (y = 0),  but along 
the foreign best response function x* fails as x rises (g < 0).  Since the 
government chooses policy first, it can correct this distortion by choosing 
s = ft*(gt) >  0 which encourages exports and  increases profits as 
ft>< 
< o, 
The optimal export policy allows the board to credibly commit to a position of 
Stackelberg leadership.  The second term in (sty)  arises because the board's —11— 
objective function does not include the profits of competitive suppliers. 
This distortion arises because of the board1s monopsony power.  An increase in 
output raises ir0 and so raises welfare.  This calls for a subsidy on 
production, so V =  .  If g = y,  there is no strategic distortion, and the 
optimal s+v is positive to correct the distortion present due to the monopsony 
oower of the board,  In addition, the optimal  level  of  (r+v)  is such that 
r  t' >  0;  because of its monopoly power, the board sets j too  low, so that a 
oonsumptior subsidy is called for,  This dscussion illustrates our targeting 
principle in oligopolistic  markets.  The export subsidy/tax is targeted to tne 
strategic distortion, the production subsidy/tax is targeted to the production 
distortion,  while the consumption distortion is targeted by a consumption 
subsidy/tax.  12 
Our results can also be illustrated using Figure 1.  "he loci  XX and VY 
iepict  the PM board's first order conditions, given r = s = v  a,  and given 
*  and  y.  Their  relative  slopes  are  given  by  our  assumption  that  the second 
)rder  conditions hold.  Thus the point A represents the profit maximizing 
hoice of x and y in the absence of policy.  The point B in the figure depicts 
Lhe welfare maximizing choice of x and y for any x.  it is determined by the 
intersection  of the xx and yy  loci,  The yy locus depicts the combinations of 
and y such that the derivative of welfare witn respect to y is zero.  xx is 
naiogously  defined taking into account that x* varies with x along the 
oreign  best response function.  Again the relative slopes are given by second 
)rder conditions.  Notice that xx and yy do not shift with  (r+v)  and (s÷vJ 
when foreign policies are given.  Optimal tax/subsidy policy is determinea so 
:hat the board's profits are maximized at B rather than A.  The levels of r,s, —I2 
and v such that welfare is stationary in x and y at  the profit maximizing 
point give the optimal policies of Figure 1. 
Recalling that an increase in (r+v)  shifts the XX locus to the right, an 
an increase in (s+v)  does the same to the Yt locus, we can determine the sign 
of optimal policies by evaluating the derivative of welfare with respect to x 
and y at A.13  Notice that at A welfare is always increasing in y.  This 
follows because the derivative of welfare with respect to y at A is 
['(y) + ne],  The derivative of welfare with respect to x at A is 
+ cl  If (gy) < 0,  welfare is increasing in x at point A, but i 
(g.y)  > 0,  welfare may be increasing or decreasing in x at A since 
and n have opposite effects.  Hence whether B lies to the northeas 
of A as we have drawn it, or northwest, depends on the sign of  (g-y). 
If  (g-y)  < 0,  the point B lies to the northeast of A.  This calls for 
(r+v)  > 0  and  (s+v)  >  0 in order to shift the XX and yy  loci  so that they 
intersect at B.  However, (g-y)  > 0 will imply B lies north or northwest of A 
Hence optimally  (r+v)  > 0,  but the sign of (s+v)  will depend on the relative 
strengths of the strategic and producer surplus distortions.  If the strategi 
distortion outweighs the producer surplus distortion, that is, B is in 
Region 2 of Diagram I,  (s+v)  < 0  and (r÷v)  > 0  is called for.  If the opposit 
is true,  B is in Region 3, so that both (s+v)  and  (r+v)  are positive.  It is 
easy to verify that B cannot be in Region 1 as this would require ft  to be 
decreasing in y at B.  This is impossible since 
fry 
at B, assuming B  is in 
Region 1,  is always positive. 
Optimal policy with a marketing board which represents the interests of 
competitive producers,  i.e.,  a SN board, is analogously derived.  Again —13- 
profits, welfare, and the first order conditions for profit and welfare 
maximization are given in Table 1, as are the optimal policies.  In tnis case, 
as no production distortion exists, it is optimal to set v  0.  (ft denotes 
net profits with a PM or SM board for notational convenience.  The ft's refer 
to different functions in the two cases.) 
Again Figure 1 can be used to illustrate the optimal choice of (v)  and 
(s+v).  As before, the XX and YY loci  depict the first order conditions for 
the board for a given x* and y in the absence of policy.  The xx and yy loci 
are defined as before so that the point B depicts the eifare  maximizing 
choice of x and y for any x*.  As before, the value of the derivatives of 
e1fare  with respect to x and y at A indicate the positior of B relative to A, 
and thus the direction of optimal policies.  The derivative of welfare with 
respect to y at A is '(y) which is positive.  The derivative of welfare ith 
respect to x at A is simply (g-l')ft* with the SN board,  rence (g-y)  < 0 
implies welfare is increasing in x at A, and this calls for  (r+v)  > 0 and 
(s+v)  > 0.  However,  {g-y)  > 0  implies welfare  is decreasing  in x  at  A.  As 
with  the  PN board,  Regon  I can  be ruled out,  so that B is in Region  2 which 
calls for  (r+v)  > 0  and (s+v)  < 0.  Optimal policies again are defined by 
stationarity of welfare with respect to x and y at the profit maximization 
point. 
For both the PM and SM ooards, tnere is no terms of trade distortion 
motivating trade policy with market segmentation,  A terms of trade distortion 
arises in perfectly competitive models of large countries because,Ia n  the 
absence of government policy, marginal cost is equated witn the average, 
rather than the marginal terms of trade from the country's point of view,  No —14- 
such distortion arises in these models of trade with market segmentation 
because, in the absence of policy, both the profit and surplus maximizing 
boards choose the  level of exports which equates marginal cost with the 
marginal revenue from exports.  In the next section we show that this changes 
when the government allows price discrimination, but does not allow the board 
to exercise monopoly power at home. 
4. ed  Boards 
In this section we study the effects of a particular way of regulating 
domestic pricing policies on optimal government intervention.  The price at 
which consumers are willing to buy an extra unit is given by d(y) + r.  This 
is called the demand price.  The price at which competitive suppliers are 
willing to sell an extra Unit is called the supply price and equals 
c(x+y) — v.  The regulation considered requires that the demand price equal 
the supply price.  This regulation prevents the exercise of monopoly power 
over domestic consumers. 
The regulation requires that: 
(1)  c(x+y) = d(y)  + (r+v). 
We focus first on a profit maximizing board.  The profits of the board ar 
given in Table 2.  However, due to the regulation, the board cannot choose the 
level of y.  Given any (r+v), and x, the level  of y is determined by (1)  and i 
denoted by (x,r+v),  It is easy to verify that x 
= c(x÷y)/d'(y) 
- 
while y  =  .  Thus the optimal choice of x for the board 
(r+v)  [d (y)  - C  (x+y)] 
is given by the first order condition for x in Table 2.  An analagous 
condition holds for the foreign board, and the  two  conditions together 
determine  the equilibrium levels of x and x  given the tax policies of —15— 
governments.  y(x,r+v) is determined through the regulatory constraint. 
As before, the government need only choose (r+v) and  (s+v)  to maximize 
social welfare given in Table 2.  Notice that in contrast to Section 3, 
the choice of y is not such that it maximizes profits given x,  i.e.,  0. 
Substituting for y(x,r÷v) in welfare and using the profit maximization 
condition yields the first order conditions for welfare maximization given in 
Table 2.  As before, g is the slope of the foreign best response function. 
Since 
;y  ' '  [d(.)  - c(.)],  +  c + • equals  d(')  c(').  The 
optimal  levels of  (r+vj  and (s+v)  implied by this are given in Table 2. 
As  usual, r, s, and v are  not uniquely defined,  Our targeting principle 
still applies, and differences between policy here and in the  absence of 
reguiaton can be explained in terms of a market linkage created by the 
government regulation.  We illustrate this in two ways. 
If the export subsidy/tax targets the strategic distort-ion,  then 
s  ft(g-7). at the optimum,  The optimal production subsidy/tax is then 
+  This  is because the presence of regulation creates a 
link between  the distortions on the production and consumption side since an 
increase in x reduces y.  A production subsidy raises x out lowers y.  The 
total  effect of a unit increase in x on  (x+y)  is  which  is positive. 
This raises rrc by [l+y}  and this effect calls for v > 0.  However, the 
reduction in y also changes  by i'y> 
and this effect calls for v < 0.  The 
optimal value of v is determined by both these effects.  Similarly, a 
consumption suesidy raises y.  However, regulation requires that the increase 
in y be induced by a reduction in x and a net reduction in (xy).  The 
increase in y raises welfare while the reduction -in  (x+y)  lowers it.  The optimal value of r is determined by both these effects to be 
r = —'x 
— m°[i+]  Notice that r = -v. 
Alternatively, the optimal policy can be implemented with only one 
instrument, s, being non-zero.  The regulation targets the consumption 
distortion.  Since there is no consumer distortion when c(x + y)  = d(y),  the 
regulation requires that any non-zero r and v be offsetting, and the simplest 
way to do this is to set both to zero.  The strategic and monopsony 
distortions remain, but these can be offset by setting s  ft*(g 
—  + 
But  notice that the optimal level  of  (s+v)  also includes y(5C  + ').  This 
term exists because the board sets foreign sales above the level at which 
marginal cost equals marginal revenue.  It does so in order to circumvent the 
regulation as increasing foreign sales raises marginal cost and hence domesti 
price.  Thus a further distortion is introduced by government regulation. 
The analysis  is similar when the marketing board maximizes producer 
surplus and is regulated.  Profits here differ from the PR case only in that 
the latter do not include the profits of coapetitive suppliers.  Once again y 
is not chosen since the hoard is regulated.  The first order condition for 
maximizing the board's objective function is given in Table 2, as is social 
welfare, which is the sum of net profits of the board, A, and consumer 
surplus, .  As  before (r+v)  and  (s+v)  are the only instruments required, and 
the first order conditions governing their choice are given in Table 2. 
Since 
5y 
=  + [d(')  — c(')j,  the optimal  level  of  (r+v)  must be zero, and 
that of  (s+v)  must be s(g-y) +  Notice  again that only s need be 
non-zero at the optimum.  Also, since the interests of competitive producers 
are taken into account in A,  the monopsony distortion is removed.  When only 
one instrument is used, s targets the strategic distortion and the induced —17— 
distortion  in  consumption.  Raising  x reduces  y and therefore  p, which  gives 
the induced consumption  distortion, 
These  results  can also be illustrated  using  Figure  1.  Where  x* is given 
as before, point  A depicts  the choice  of x and y which  maximizes  the board's 
objective  function  in  the absence of either  regulation  or  taxes.  The point B 
depicts  the welfare  maximizing  choice of x and y. 
Under regulation,  the board's choice  of x and y is defined  by  the 
tangency  of its highest perceived  isoprofit  contour  with  the regulatory  locus, 
whose  position  is  determined  by (r+v).  Since  the objective  is to have the 
tangency  occur  at B, this  requires  setting  (r+v)  0 so that the regulatory 
locus coincides  with the yy  curve.  The tangency  occurs  at a point  C in  Figure 
I for r = v  = s  = 0.  By altering  (s+v), different  points  along  the yy locus 
can be reached.  In particular,  the point  B can be made  to be the board's 
optimal choice.  The  (s+v} that performs  this function  is implicitly  defined 
by the slope  of a perceived  isoprofit  contour given  y and this  (s+v) being 
equal  to the slope  of  the yy locus at  B. 
This results  in levels of (s+v) given  in Table  2.  The sum of the last 
two terms  in the optimal value  of (s÷v) for the PR  board  is positive,  so that 
(s+v) > 0 when (g-y) < 0.  In this  case the point  C, i.e., the tangency  for 
(s+v) = 0,  occurs to the left of B.  Shifting  the board's  isoprofit contours 
appropriately  can be  achieved  by an export  subsidy which  raises  x, moving  the 
tangency  point  towards B.  When (g—y) > 0, appropriate  policy  may be either  an 
export  tax or subsidy  since  the tangency  for (s+v) = 0  may occur either  to the 
right or left of B.  With a SR  board  the appropriate  policy may be either an 
export  tax or  subsidy  depending  on the sign of  ÷ ''>' i.e.,  the 
relative size  of the distortions. —18— 
Notice that  (r+v)  is optimally zero in the regulated case since B lies 
along the yy locus and (r+v)  = 0  along this locus.  However, regulation alonE 
does not  lead to the first best optimum since tangency at B is not ensured 
when  (s#v)  = 0. 
5.  The Case of Many  Market-ins 
In this section we analyze optimal government policy when there are m 
domestic marketing boards and m* foreign marketing boards.  While Sections 3 
and 4 describe the cases one usually thinks of with regard to agricultural 
marketing boards; there are cases where different regions within a country 
have their own marketing boards,  In addition, our analysis is intended to 
apply to policy targeting for any oligopolistic industry where imperfectly 
competitive exporters purchase a product from competitive producers to sell 
both at home and in world markets.  Hence it is of interest to know how the 
number of boards in the domestic and foreign market  affects optimal policy. 
We  shall present the analysis for boards which maximize profits in the 
absence of regulation.  As in Section 3, domestic boards are the sole 
suppliers to domestic consumers, and compete with foreign boards in the thirc 
market.  They are assumed to price discriminate between their domestic markel 
and the third market.  We choose this example to illustrate the effect of 
having more boards because of the existence of both producer and consumer 
surplus distortions. 
Recall that optimal policy was determined by three kinds of distortions 
when a single domestic marketing board and a single foreign board competed ir 
a third market.  A  consumption distortion called for a consumption -19- 
subsidy/tax,  a production distortion called for a production subsidy/tax, and 
a strategic distortion called for an export subsidy/tax.  As the number of 
boards in the domestic market is increased, we would expect the consumption 
and production distortions to decrease because the ability of boards to 
exercise monopoly or monopsony power would decline.  As these distortions 
decline we would expect the role of government policy in offsetting them to 
decline.  Also, the results of Dixit (1984) and Eaton and Grossman (1986) show 
that the strategic distortion depends on the number of boards and that a terms 
of trade distort,on is created because of the inabflty of a domestic board to 
internalize the effects of  its actions on the terms of trade.  This intuition 
is easily verified. 
in oroer to focus on the effect of market size on distortions, we present 
the case of many marketing boards with Cournot competition.  We look at 
identical boards at home and, similarly, at identical boards abroad, and 
consider the symmetric equilibrium. 
Profits of the ith domestic board are given in Table 3.  Capital V and X 
denote total sales of all  domestic boards at home and in the third market, and 
X* denotes total sales of foreign exporting boards in the third market. 
Profits of the jth foreign board are given by an analogous equation.  Each 
ooard chooses x1 and y1 to maximize ir, given r, s, v and its conjecture that 
both domestic  and foreign rival boards maintain given sales at home and 
abroad.  The first order conditions for each board are as given in Table 3. 
Given Cournot competition, the sum of all of the m boards' first orde' 
conditions at home can be written as: -20- 
(2)  d'(Y)Y + md('()  — c'(X+Y)(X+Y)  - mc(X+Y)  +  m(r+v)  = 0 
(3)  D!(X+X*)X +  mO(X+X*)  c'(X+Y)(X+Y)  mc()+Y)  + m(s+v)  = 0 
Similar equations arise from summing the m* foreign boards! first order 
conditions.  It is easily verified from these four equations that 




which we will  denote by  g.  The usual  second order 
and stability conditions are  assumed. 
The government chooses  (s+v)  and  (r+v)  to maximize welfare.  Table 3 
gives social welfare and  the first order conditions for welfare  maximization, 
where  use is made of  (2) and (3) and the definition of g given above.  These 
first order conditions define the optimal policies in Table 3.  As before, v 
can be targeted toward the production distortion, and equals rr /m.  r then 
targets the consumption distortion, given by '/m.  The strategic and terms of 
trade distortions are targeted by s, which is now given by D'Xg + D'X[m-l]/m, 
The first term represents the familiar strategic distortion in the Cournot 
case.  With downward slcping best response functions this calls for a subsidy. 
However, with  more  boards,  competition  among  hoards  in  the third market is 
excessive  since firms  do  not fully internalize the effects of their output 
decisions on  price faced  by domestic ooards,  This is captured  by  the second 
term  and calls for a tax for ml,,  Since the strategic and  terms of  trade 
distortions have opposing effects,  the sign  of s  is ambiguous  and  depends  on 
the relative magnitudes of  g  and  [m—1]/m,  The slope  of  the foreign best 
response  function, g, depends on the number of foreign boards as well as 
demand and cost  parameters,  so  that whether an export  tax or subsidy  is called 
for  depends  on  the relative number  of boards at home  and abroad. —21— 
As before, the optimal policies are implioit as X and V depend on (r÷v) 
and (s+v).  Explicit solutions for the optimal policies in a linear example 
are available from the authors.  With  linear demand and marginal cost, the 
optimal value of  (r+v)  approaches zero as the number of home boaros approaches 
infinity  This results from the diminished ability of home boards to exercise 
monopoly and monopsony power at home as m becomes  large.  The optical  (s÷v) 
oecomes a tax as m approaches infinity  This is oecause the terms of trade 
distortion outwe'ghs toe strategic distortion, and the production distortion 
vanishes. 
6.  orcratnArbitrae 
64  The Ef'ect of Arb4traae 
in our analysis so fr we  have assumed that no arbitrage is possible 
between markets  This is wrat allowed the neat targeting results of the 
earlier sectors  in tbs  section we show that the effec  of arcitrage on the 
nature of optma  poHcies is sbstant'al,  Aro4rage- l4ks  marKets an 
distortions, creating multimarket effects of poiicies and so Lnks the dptiaal 
levels as which tne instruments are set.  While arbitrage prevents-  '-v-ms  'roe 
setting domestic and foreign sales separately, the government can helo 
separate marKets by settng  trade taxes'sios'dies to do so. 
We show that with arbitrage, a regulated board loses toe ad'  ity to 
behave strategically.  This is because regulation with aro4trage regulates the 
world market and essentially redvoes the board to follow marginal cost pricing 
and behave comoetitively.  This remojes any production, cnrsumpton  and 
strategic thstortions.  However, it creates  the usual terms of trade 22 
distortion since the government can change toe teras of trade by its trade 
tax/subsidy policies.  Thus  the optsa poroy  here is shown to be one that 
targets tne terms of trade distortion and consists of only an export tax or 
:wport tariff depending or whether the country 45 5 net exporter cr  worte, 
This is true whether we consicer a PR or SR board. 
The optaai polc4es wirout  regulaUor are sore oospex.  e  are jze a 
SN board, Ieav4ng the ana!yss ot a Ph osrd tu th  reader  :r b's  case! t a 
zunslrrt4on sutsidy/tax car be set so as to equre ?argina  vtTht/  of 
rsumption at ose  with narginal cost  prooucror and ths  cart 'or a 
;onsusption subsidy  S4nce boards have oarket prwar  the production 
tax/subsidy then is set to target the strateglo and rtber thsnrt'ons 
Arbitrage requires that the pr4oe bcards receive at nose cpus' the price 
owey receive abroad so that for the home board: 
d(y) +r+v=2(x+x*)  as—v 
i:e  we are assuming ta  ootb ooards oouc'  a homogeneous good in ts 
section for simolicity.5  This equatThn shows how arbitrage links x ard y for 
any given x* ard (sri,  Let y(x+x*, sr  be ispo-tiy  oefired by the 
solution to  (4).  y() rises with  (x÷x*) and f5ii5 with 's-r;.  This  is 
beoause an increase in (x÷x*) reduces the world price, and by arbitrage 
reduces the domestic price, raising domestic oorsusption.  An ino'ease in 
sr) raises domestic price, reduoing consumption at hose!  The board can 
toerefore only set x indeoendently.  The aralogy to regulation is apparent. 
However, in this case y and x are positively related, wnile with reguiatior 
oney are negatively related.  In addition, the arbitrage locus is not as —23— 
closely  related to the welfare maximizing locus, yy,  as the regulation 
condition  is. 
We will consider  the case with arbitrage and regulation first since it 
more  transparent. 
6.2  Arbitrage and Regulation 
Regulation requires that the board equate the demand and supply price a 
home.  With arbitrage this means that it must  be set so that 
(5)  d(y(x+x*, s-r)) + r  = c(x + y(x÷x*, s—r))  v. 
Thus, for a given x*, the board has no choice in setting x.  Thus (5 is tne 
analogue of the home boards  best response function in earlier sections,  Th 
analogous equation defined for the foreign board gives another relationship 
between x and x*, and is 
(6>  d*(y*(x+x*, s*r*)) + r*  c*(x* + y*(x+x*,  5*_r*))  v. 
Together  these equations solve for the equilibrium levels of x and x* f 
any  given levels of taxes.  Notice that (5) and  (5)  hold irrespective of 
whether we have a PR board or a SR board,  Also, since home taxes/subsidies 
only affect the location of (5),  g,  the change in x  as x changes along (5) 
the ratio  for a =  (r+v}  and (s-r).  As usual, we assume that the 
dx/da 
relative slopes of best response functions are such that the equilibrium is 
stable. 
Now we are ready to define optimal policy.  As before, welfare equals t 
sum of consumer surplus and total  net profits.  With a SR board these are u —24-- 
the board's  profits.  With a PR  board,  these equal  the sum of the board's 
profits  and those of  competitive  producers.  In either  case: 
(7)  W = $(y('))  + [d(y('fly(') + D(x+x*)x  - C(x+y('fl] 
= (y()) + ft(x,x*,v(.)) 
where  C(S)  is total cost.  Since  the equilibrium  level of x depends on (s-r), 
(rev),  (s*_r*), and  (r*+v*) from (5) and  (6),  so does  y.  Therefore  welfare 
can be affected only by changing  (s—r) and (rev).  The former is  the 
difference  between  the price consumers  face  at  home,  d(y),  and the price  that 
consumers  face  abroad,  D(x+x*) as seen from the arbitrage  condition  (4).  The 
latter  is the difference  between marginal  costs  and the price  consumers  face 
at home  by (5). 
Thus,  the optimal  levels of (s-r) and (rev) are implicitly  defined  by the 
following:16 
dW  V  ldx 
d(r+v) 











+ '  J[vx+x*1+9d(r) 
+  = 
This  requires  that: 
(10) 
lty 
+ t'(y)  = d(y)  — c(y)  = 0 
(11)  +  = D'(x+x*)x(l+g)  + 0(X+X*)  - c(x+y) 
= 0'(x+x*)x(l+g)  (s+v) = 0 —25'- 
where the second equality in (11)  comes from the arbitrage and regulation 
conditions.  Thus, from (10)  and regulation we know (r+v)  = 0  optimally, while 
from  (11)  we know that (s+v)  = 0(x+x*)x(1+g).  Therefore, r = V  =  0,  and 
s  < 0 if x > 0,  i.e.,  an export tax,  and s > 0 if x < 0.  As usual, we 
interpret the latter as an import tarif',  in this we are assuming that 
(1÷g)  > 0  as it is with symmetry and stability. 
The optimal policies can be understood using Figure 2, whicn is drawn for 
x* equal to its equilioriua value with r, s, v, set optimally.  yy and xx have 
the same interpretation as before,  The FR line gives the locus of points 
satisfying the regulation eouation (5).  RR is drawn for (rev)  0.  It lies 
above yy ehich  is also the regulatory if (rtv)  = 0.  xx and yy intersect at B. 
The curve aa is the arbitrage ecJation  (4) for 5  r = 0.  The 4ntersecton  of 
RR and ca at A gives the equiiibHun levels  of x and y for  s = r  = 0, v  > 0. 
The governmert's proolem is to scve A to B.  This is done by settng  r = v = 
which  moves RR to yy.  This moves tne intersection to C.  in addition, tne cc 
curve has to cc moveo to go througn B.  This is done by changing 5.  gure  2 
is drawn for the case where an export tax is optimal  A tax on exports is 
optimal if the equilibrium level of x, when policies are set optimally, is 
positive.  In this case the cc curve with s = 0  lies below B as showr.  A 
decrease  in s shifts cc up to cc so that the intersection ooint of  the 
arbitrage and regulation equations goes through B. 
6,3  raewithoutReulat)On 
In the absence of regulation, arbitrage merely limits the ability o  the 
board to set both x and y independently.  It does not remove the cno Ce of -26 
output itself as occurs when regulation is also imposed.  We will consider the 
SN board here, leaving the analysis of the PM board to the reader.  ft  denotes 
net profits of the board. 
Maximization of profits, after substituting in for y(xtx*, sr) 
determined by  (4),  gives: 
a  + a,i 
+ (s+v)  + Lit +  (r+v)]y*(1+7) 
0 
here y is the conjectured variation on x  by the home board.  A similar 
souction exists for the foreign board, and the equilibrium values of x and 
are iapiicitiy defined by these two equations.  Once again changes in r, s. 
and v shift (12),  and trace out the foreign best response function so that g 
has  the usual meaning. 
The welfare maximizing choices of  (s+v)  and (sr) are defined by the 
oovernment's first order conditions.  These imply that the optimal  (sty)  and 
(s-r)  are those defined by  (13)  and (14)  below: 
C13)  a  +it  g=O  •  x  x. 
+ 'i'(y)  = d(y)  c(x+y) 
= O(x+x*)  c(x+y) + (s-r)  = 0 
where the second equality arises from using the arbitrage condition.  The 
optimal level of  (s-r)  is thus: 
sr  = _(D(x+x*)  c(x+y)] 
Therefore, if the world price exceeds marginal cost of production, the price 
to consumers at home should be below the price to consumers in the third 27- 
market, Le., this calls for a consumption subsidy.  Substituting for the 
boards  first order condition in (13) and for (s-r)  yields: 
ir(g-y) 
-  (s+v) [1+y  (1+)1 -  (it  +  D-c)y+*(l+T) 
= 0 
This gives the optimal level of  (s+v)  as: 
(s+v)  =  —  [ft  + (0-c)] 
y  1+y(1+y) 
Let s = 0  so that (15) gives r and (1'7) gives  v. 
To interpret these policies first recall that there is no production 
distortion with the SN board.  The board exercises monopoly power at home in 
the absence of regulation,  and our  analysis shows a consumption subsidy should 
be targeted toward this distortion  Notice that the consumption subsidy is 
set so that d(y)  c(x+y), but arbitrage links d(y) to the world price. 
Also notice that,  because of the multimarket linkages caused by 
arbitrage, the strategic distortion does not enter in the setting of  (s-r),  so 
that  a production subsidy can be targeted  toward the strategic  distorticn 
Again,  arbitrage crucially affects the targeting principle as the optimal 
level  of v is determined by linkage effects  in addition  to the strategic 
ft 
distortion.  Hence, the strategic term in (17)  is 
1+y  (1+)') 
Also notice 
x+x* 
that the optimal v includes both this strategic effect and an additional terii 
because of arbitrage. -28-' 
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have attempted to illustrate  how the oonoept of a 
strategio distortion can be used to identify optimal polioy in imperfectly 
competitive markets, and to derive an analogue of the targeting principle for 
competitive markets.  As we have shown, this is such easier, when price 
disorimination is allowed between markets, as arbitrage links markets togetner 
creating muitimarket effects of a policy.  However, even in the presence of 
arbitrage and in the absence of regulation, the strategic distortion 
infThences  only  (s÷v), the wedge between the producer price and the consume 
price in the third market,  the world price.  It does not affect (sr), 
the wedge between the consumer price at home, d(y), and the world price, ON) 
Regulation eliminates any strategic distortion and a role for policy exists to 
the extent that exports exist and the terms of trade can be affected by 
pol  icy 
There are a  issues which are not addressed in our analysis. 
nkating  boards are often direct extensions of the government, and have the 
same objective function as the government.  in this case, the government can 
have no effect on welfare unless it has some advantage, informational or 
otherwise over the board.  However, in general, any objective function on the 
part of the board and of government can be handled and the results will, of 
course, be sensitive to the formulation employed. 
it may be argued that the direction of the strategic distortion is hard 
to identify in practice; however, recent work suggests that computable partial 
equilibrium models, such as Dixit (1288), can be used to estimate the 
strategic distortion, making practical applications feasible.  On the other —29— 
hand,  precommitment to a policy may be hard and possible retaliation by other 
countries could undo any beneficial effects of such policies.  Also optimal 
policy becomes much more complex when one allows for endogenous distortions, 
as in Rodrik (1987).  Simple targeting prnciples are no longer applicable in 
such scenarios.  Finally, the reader may be perturbed by the nonuniqueness of 
r, s, and v.  Such nonuniquesness is generic in these models, and in this 
paper we assign instruments to distortions following economic intuition.  A 
way of pinning this down would be to include a cost of such policies but this 
would obfuscate the targeting principles derived here 
We beiieve that our work is important for at least two reasons.  First, 
it shows that use of trade policy should be examined, in terms of optimality, 
by considering all  existing distortions and avalable instruments.  This is 
because trade policy may be unable to target all  the distort4ons and thus be 
far from first best when consioered in isolation-  Our targeting principle 
allows us to interpret when trade policy is first best. 
Second, while computable part1al equil4brium models promise to help 
formulate optimal policy, our results show that optimal poiicy is sensitive to 
assumptions about market structure, arbitrage, and regulation.  The use of 
such models is warranted only when sensitivity analysis ndicates the results 
are not dramatically affected by changes in model structure,  Our work would 
help in developing model variations for sensitivity analysis and in 
interpreting the results of such exercises.  In future work we hope to provide 
further applications of targeting as well as address some of the issues raised 
above. —30- 
Footnotes 
1,  See Bhagwati  (1971). 
2.  See for example Krishna (1984) and Krishna and Itoh (1988). 
3.  A related paper is Brander and Spencer  (1985).  We will not discuss the 
literature in detail, but refer the interested reader to the excellent survey 
by Dixit (1987). 
4.  The terms of trade distortion exists because of a coordination problem. 
The individual firms take the world price as given, when it,  in fact, depeno; 
on total  domestic output.  In the case of one home firm, no such problem 
arises, 
5.  Eaton and Grossman  (1986) allow arbitrage when domestic consumption is 
included and point out that the effect of policy on the price faced by 
doaestic consumers  is vital, 
6.  Just et al.  (1979) derive optimal policy for each of the institutional 
variations in marketing boards we consider in Sections 3 and 4.  However, 
their analysis is of a marketing board which is a monopolist in the world 
market, so that strategic effects are absent.  Their analysis is also a 
partial equilibrium one  like ours. 
Markusen  (1984)  examines a board which maximizes producer surplus, with 
and without regulation.  His analysis is a general equilibrium one, but his 
focus is not on strategic interactions between boards. 
7.  See Hoos (1979) and World Development Report (1986) for some examples of 
real life marketing boards and how such boards operate in different countries. -31— 
Greater product differentiation can be allowed, but as it adds little to 
he interpretations offered and does complicate the derivations.  In later 
ections when we allow arbitrage, we assume the same homogeneous good  is 
roduced by both domestic and foreign firms as product differentiation greatly 
omplicates tne analysis. 
The standard objection to conjectural variations models is the absence of 
well defined extensive form.  However, we feel that its usefulness in 
arameteritng  the nature of competition and the strategic distortion warrants 
ts use as an expository tool in this paper. 
0.  Changing  this assumption will only have quantitative, not qualitative, 
ffects. 
1.  It is worth noticing that 1n the absence of arbitrage between home and 
oreign markets, the government can create a wedge between the price producers 
et at home, P 
and the pice  consumers pay at home  and the price producers 
at abroad P  and the price consumers pay abroad,  Since 
= d(y)  + (r+v),  pn = d(y),  = D(x,x*)  ÷  (s+v),  end  = D(x,x),  the 
ormer wedge is given by the size of  (r+v),  and the latter  by (s÷v),  This is 
he reason why only (r÷v)  and (sty)  enter the problem. 
2.  Expressing these policies in tems  of e1asticites  provides additional 
ituition.  s/D = -(gy)9/E where 9 is the share of the home board in the 
nird market and E is the elasticity of denand in the third market.  Thus the 
Kport subsidy as a percentage of the world price is greater the larger is 
/E.  Also r/d = I/c  where e is the home market's elasticity of demand.  Thus 
ie consumption subsidy is high in percentage terms when the market elasticity 
s  low.  Finally, v/c = r where p is the elasticity of marginal cost.  Thus v —32- 
as a percentage of marginal cost is large when marginal cost is elastic in 
output, i.e. when marginal cost rises relatively fast. 
13.  Of course, we are assuming that both welfare and the board's objective 
functions are well behaved.  That is,  they are quasiconcave and have a unique 
maximum. 
1&  See Jones  (1987)  for a discussion of the optimum tariff and market 
segmentation with a private monopolist. 
15  This allows us to keep the framework as close to the no arbitrage case 
possible.  Allowing product differentiation with arbitrage would significanti 
complicate the analysis of arbitrage without adding much to the results 
16.  Note that although y(x÷x*, s—r), we are using x  to denote the derivativ 
of ft  with respect to x for a given y, while 
fty 
denotes the derivative of ft 
with respect to y given x. —33— 
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